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The goal of the stable marriage problem is to match by pair two sets composed by the same number of elements. Due to its
widespread applications in the real world, especially the unique importance to the centralized matchmaker, a very large number
of questions have been extensively studied in this ﬁeld. This article considers a generalized form of the stable marriage problem,
where diﬀerent numbers of men and women need to be matched pairwise and the emergence of single men or women is
inevitable. Theoretical analysis and numerical simulations conﬁrm that even a small deviation on the number of men and
women from the equality condition can have a large impact on the matching solution of the Gale-Shapley algorithm. These
results provide insights to many of the real-world applications when matching two sides with an unequal number.
1. Introduction
The stable marriage problem (SMP) consists in matching
men and women by pairs. By extension, this problem can
consist in the matching of two groups composed of diﬀerent
elements. For instance, there are extensive applications in
college admissions [1], labor markets [2], and many other
social systems [3]. The recent advances in Internet technol-
ogy have introduced the SMP into new applications: assign-
ing a large number of users to internet server [4], matching
peers in a P2P network according to preference [5], the
resource allocation in 5G networks [6], or the matching
mechanism of real-world dating website [7].
Many researchers studied the algorithms and proper-
ties on this fascinating and practical problem. The study
of the SMP started in 1962 with the Gale-Shapley (G-S) algo-
rithm [1]. This algorithm matches men and women with the
guarantee that there is always a stable match for an equal
number of men and women [8]. In 2012, the Nobel Prize in
Economics was awarded to Lloyd S. Shapley and Alvin E.
Roth for “the theory of stable allocations and the practice of
market design.” In this algorithm, each man ranks women
separately, from his favorite to his least favorite. Then, each
man who is still single issues a proposal to the highest woman
in his list who has not rejected him yet. The woman then
decides to accept or reject him, by retaining only the man
who is the most desirable to her. This solution is proved to
be one of the stable men-optimal solutions.
Besides mathematicians and computer scientists, statisti-
cal physicists are also interested in this issue [9, 10]. Indeed,
statistical physics is used to treat the problem with a large
number of particles, which is also well-suited to treat the
SMP. The mean ﬁeld theory was applied to calculate satisfac-
tion of both men and women in the stable marriage problem,
and it was found that men, who are the active side, were far
happier than women [11]. This method can also be used to
estimate the number of stable solutions [12, 13]. The replica
method used in spin glass was applied to study the global
optimal solution in bipartite matching, although this is not
a stable solution [14–17]. In addition, some interesting varied
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variations have been studied, such as the impact of matching
on the matching of partial information [18, 19], spatial distri-
bution, intrinsic ﬁtness [20], and acceptance threshold [13].
So far, mainstream research has been focusing on the
matching of the equal number of the two sides. In fact,
however, real-world matching problems are seldom a
match of a precisely equal size of two sides. We have seen
many examples in daily life, the student admission, job
market, the recent “one to one poverty alleviation program”
policy promoted by the Chinese government, or even the real
application of SMP: the marriage matching on dating website
[7]. These problems are mostly matching between diﬀerent
numbers of elements on both sides. We are curious to know
whether the original stable solution of the Gale-Shapley
algorithm can be applied to these unequal size-matching
problems and, if not, how would the stable solution of match-
ing be changed? What is the overall happiness of all agents in
the stable solution? Here, in this paper, we extend the stable
marriage problem to a generalized stable marriage problem
(GSMP), which represents a matching between any given
sizes of the two sides. Dzierzawa and Oméro [13] imple-
mented the numerical simulation to test the matching result
of N + 1men and N women, and their simulation shows that
in this case, women are far happier thanmen according to the
Gale-Shapley algorithm. This is hugely diﬀerent from what
the original SMP stable solution suggests. This is crucial
because it reveals that the Gale-Shapley solution is very sen-
sitive to even the smallest variation in the number of people
and actually cannot be directly used to analyze many unequal
size-matching problems. We further thoroughly study the
stable solution in GSMP, a matching between any number
of men and women. We carry out a theoretical analysis of
the stable solution for GSMP and obtain the average happi-
ness for men and women for any given population, and the
result is in perfect match with the numerical simulations.
2. Methods
We start with the classical scenario with N male and M
females to match pairwise. Here, we assume that everyone
knows all people from the opposite gender and that there is
a wish list for each person which represents the ranking of
all persons from the other gender to her/his preference. Fol-
lowing previous research models [11, 13, 17], a reasonable
and simple assumption is that all wish lists are randomly
established and irrelevant. We deﬁne an energy function for
each person, which is equal to the ranking of their eventual
partner in their wish list. The lower energy one has, the hap-
pier the person is. When N =M, it is the conventional SMP.
Here, we extend the SMP to groups with diﬀerent sizes.
When N ≠M, obviously, there will be some people who will
remain single. For these persons, their energy is deﬁned as
one worse than the bottom of the wish list; that is to say,
the energy is M + 1 for single men and N + 1 for women.
Since the number of single persons is obvious, the result of
the calculation can be simply converted for other deﬁnitions.
Here, we use Greek letters to represent men and Latin letters
to represent women. Their energy is denoted as em and ew for
men and women, respectively.
The G-S algorithm runs as follows: unengaged men will
continue to send proposals to women, and women keep the
one she prefers between the suitor and her provisional part-
ner. The process stops when no man issues proposal again,
either all men are engaged or the unengaged men are rejected
by everyone. ForN ≤M, this means that all men are engaged.
For the case ofN >M,Mmen are engaged and the remaining
N −M men are still single.
3. Result and Discussion
The stable marriage problem of the equal size of the two sides
has been thoroughly studied by many previous researches.
For M =N , several studies have proved that in the stable
solution of G-S the algorithm, the average energy of men is
ϵm = log N , and the average energy of women is ϵw =N/
log N .
3.1. Matching for M >N
3.1.1. The Average Energy of Men. First, let us consider the
situation that the number of women M is larger than the
number of men N . During the process of men proposing to
women, we notice the following: (1) the total energy of men
is equal to the number of proposals men have already sent.
(2) Once a woman is engaged, she will remain engaged (per-
haps with diﬀerent men) forever; that is to say, the number of
partners will never decrease.
Now, we focus on the number of matched pairs in the
proposing process; when it reaches to N , every man has
already been assigned to a partner and the proposal pro-
cess stops. When the number of matched pairs is K , there
are M − K women who remain unengaged. If one proposal
is sent to an engaged woman, no matter the suitor or the
woman’s current provisional partner wins, the number of
matched pairs will not change. If a proposal is sent to
an unengaged woman, which has a probability of M − K /
M, the number of matched pairs will increase to K + 1. It is
easy to deduce that on average M/ M − K , proposals have
to be sent to match one more pair.
Thus, in order to increase the number of matched pairs
from 0 to N , the expected total number of proposals men
have to send is
LN ,M = 〠
N−1
K=0
M
M − K
=M 〠
M
i=1
1
i
− 〠
M−N
j=1
1
j
1
Hence, the average energy of men when M >N is
ϵm =
LN ,M
N
= M
N
ln M
M −N
2
3.1.2. The Average Energy of Women. To obtain the average
energy of women ϵw, let us consider the ﬁnal stable solution,
in which everyone’s partner has been determined. Let us
assume a chosen woman who was ﬁnally paired with the
man ranked β in her list, so men who ranked higher than β
in her list did not issue a proposal to her. According to the
ranking of the men in the women’s list, let us denote the
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men’s energy as follows: ϵm α , α ∈ 1, 2,⋯,N . The men
who ranked in the top β − 1 in the woman’s list must have
a better partner than the woman, which means the energy
of the woman is higher than that of the assigned partners of
these men. This is because if the rank of the lady in a certain
men’s list is less than the energy value of the man, then he
must have already issued a proposal to the woman according
to the G-S Algorithm, thus causing a conﬂict. We can com-
pute the probability of a woman matched with the man
ranked β in her list:
Pβ = ∐
β−1
α=1
1 − ϵm α
M
∗
ϵm β
M
3
The energy of the single women is equal to N + 1. They
did not receive any proposal; the probability is:
PN+1 =
N
α=1
1 − ϵm α
M
4
Similarly, we use ϵm to replace ϵm α ; then we have
Pβ = 1 −
ϵm
M
β−1
∗
ϵm
M
,
PN+1 = 1 −
ϵm
M
N
5
Consider ϵw =∑β ∗ pβ; we can estimate the average
energy of women:
ϵw =
ϵm
M
〠
N
i=1
i ∗ 1 − ϵm
M
i−1
+ N + 1 ∗ 1 − ϵm
M
N
6
The summation of the series gives
ϵw =
ϵm
M
1 − 1 − ϵm /M N
ϵm/M 2
+ 1 − ϵm
M
N
7
Since we have ϵm = M/N ln M/ M −N ,
1 − ϵm/M N approximately is equal to M −N /M.
ϵw =
N
ϵm
+ M −N
M
, 8
and also we can see
ϵw ∗ ϵm ≃N 9
3.2. Matching for M <N
3.2.1. The Average Energy of Women. While M <N , let us
denote the energy of each woman as ϵi, and the average of
ϵi is denoted by ϵw.
In the ﬁnal matching state, all the women are matched
butN −Mmen are left single. The probability of a man being
single is Mi=1 1 − ϵi/N ; i.e., he is ranked lower than any of
the current partner in women’s lists. In total, we have N −M
men who are single, which means the probability of being
single is N −M /N , so we have
M
i=1
1 − ϵi
N
= N −M
N
10
Approximately, we use ϵw to replace ϵi,
1 − ϵw
N
M
= N −M
N
, 11
by taking the logarithm of both sides; we have
ϵw =
N
M
ln N
N −M
12
3.2.2. The Average Energy of Men. Let us consider the ﬁnal
stable state of matching which we know the exact matching
result of everyone. For any chosen man, we denote the energy
of women in his list as ϵw j , j ∈ 1, 2,… ,M . Then we have
the probability that he was accepted by the woman ranked ith
in his list:
Qi =
i−1
j=1
1 − ϵw j
N
ϵw i
N
13
And the probability that he was rejected by all women is
(we assume the energy of each single men is M + 1)
QM+1 =
M
j=1
1 − ϵw j
N
14
We can approximate ϵw j with the mean value ϵw, when
N is large. By averaging over i, we obtain:
ϵm = 〠
M
i=1
i 1 − ϵw
N
i−1 ϵw
N
+ M + 1 1 − ϵw
N
M
,
ϵm =
ϵw
N
1 − 1 − ϵw/N M
ϵw/N 2
+ 1 − ϵw
N
M
,
15
since 1 − ϵw/N M = N −M /N ; we have
ϵw ϵm −
N −M
M
=M 16
3.3. Numerical Simulations. The simulation result is shown
in Figure 1. Without the loss of generality, we ﬁx the
number of men equal to 1000 and vary the number of
women M from 1 to 2000. Under our deﬁnition of single’s
energy, as our theoretical result predicted, the average
energy of men increases in the beginning and almost
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saturate when M reaches around 700. The energy plateau
is mainly caused by the fact that we set the energy of sin-
gle men at M + 1. Although other deﬁnitions may apply,
we choose this deﬁnition out of many reasonable ones to
make the theoretical analysis easier. It is notable that the
average energy is low when M is close to 1. It is instruc-
tive to many social phenomena. When there are too few
women (M close to 1), most men end up single in the
matching. But the feeling of happiness, as written by soci-
ologist Ruut Veenhoven [21], “results from comparison”
may come from the relative comparison among surround-
ings, so that the overall happiness which is low may not
be a surprising outcome.
The energies of both men and women have dramatic
changes when M approaches 1000. The energy of men
has a sharp drop in this region while the energy of women
experiences a big rise. The energies of the active side and
passive side exchange their positions. As M increases, the
energy of men continues to decrease; at the meantime,
the energy of women keeps growing which is natural for
the situation that more women compete for a certain
number of men. In total, our simulation result veriﬁed
our previous theoretical analysis.
For many of the actual matching problems, the change in
the number of people’s happiness is not as sensitive to the
theoretical predictions. This may be due to some intrinsic
factors: appearance, test scores, university rankings, work
ability, salary level, and so on, which will cause the wish list
to become relevant. One of our studies recently [22] reveals
that the correlation of the people’s wish lists can signiﬁcantly
reduce the inherent instability of the G-S algorithm in the
generalized group size case.
4. Conclusion
In summary, we extend the study of the conventional stable
marriage problem to groups with diﬀerent numbers of
persons. This study has a realistic impact because the num-
bers of matching parties are often diﬀerent in many scenarios
in the real world and the losers of the competition are
widespread. For the traditional N men-M women matching
problem, it is widely accepted that the Gale-Shapley algo-
rithm leads to a matching result in which the active side
occupies a huge advantage. However, we ﬁnd that even by
reducing only one woman, the men of the active side become
obviously disadvantageous, which means that original stable
matching solution is super sensitive to changes in the
number of matching members.
In this paper, we thoroughly study the matching solution
of unequally sized stable marriage problem and provide both
a theoretical solution and numerical simulations. These ﬁnd-
ings help to further understand the structure and properties
of the SMP solution; it also sheds a light on the matching pro-
cess of matchmakers or resource allocators who deal with
many of the real bipartite matching problems with scarcity
of one side.
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